Investigating SCADA Failures in Interdependent Critical Infrastructure
  Systems by Ebrahimy, Razgar
1 
 
Investigating SCADA Failures in Interdependent  
Critical Infrastructure Systems 
 
Razgar Ebrahimy 
School of Computing Science, Newcastle University, 
Newcastle Upon Tyne, UK 
Razgar.ebrahimy@ncl.ac.uk 
  
 
Abstract— this paper is based on the initial ideas of a research 
proposal which will investigate SCADA failures in physical 
infrastructure systems. The results will be used to develop a new 
notation to help risk assessment using dependable computing 
concepts.  SCADA systems are widely used within critical 
infrastructures to perform system controls and deliver services to 
linked and dependent systems. Failures in SCADA systems will 
be investigated to help  understand and prevent cascading 
failures in future.      
I. Introduction  
Critical Infrastructures are those kinds of systems and 
assets, physical or virtual, so important and vital to nations 
and societies that destruction and failure of them could have a 
debilitating impact on national security, economy and national 
health and safety [1], [2].  Critical and national infrastructures 
form the backbone of our modern communities [3] and they 
are the fundamental factors in providing economic 
productivity and social wellbeing [4].  
Physical infrastructure consists of energy, transport, waste, 
water and the newly emerged ICT sector.  Moreover very high 
cross-sector interdependency exists between all these sectors 
[6]. These interdependencies highlight the importance of 
availability of services by each sector in order to provide 
services and facilitate other dependent sectors.  Generally, 
failures of one infrastructure could lead to the failure and 
stoppage of services in another dependent infrastructure.  For 
instance, all infrastructures rely on availability of electricity, 
hence power outage can have direct impact on availability of 
other services, such as transport, emergency, finance, 
communication, water supply etc. 
Infrastructure assets have evolved over a period of time. 
Moreover infrastructure projects developments and 
maintenance are very costly for governments to fund [37]. As 
a result modeling and simulation tools are used to aid the 
policy makers in planning and investing in infrastructure.  
Some of these tools can be very helpful and used to assess 
risks, opportunities and threats analysis. Some of these tools 
can indicate what the existing infrastructure could face in 
future, for instance analyzing supply and demand, investment 
and risk analysis. To show the role and importance of these 
modeling tools, a dedicated section describes them in more 
detail. 
The UK Infrastructure Transitions Research Consortium 
(ITRC), which was established jointly by several UK 
universities, aims to inform the analysis, planning and design 
of national infrastructure through the development and 
demonstration of new decision support tools, and working 
with partners in government and industry. This research is part 
of an ITRC project with focus on risks and failures of ICT 
infrastructure. 
  ITRC’s initial interest in ICT has been to analyze the 
development and upgrading of current communication 
systems in the UK infrastructure. Another objective has been 
to investigate ICT impacts, including failures and 
opportunities to other sectors, and also to quantify and 
measure the values that the ICT sector and component add to 
the operation of other infrastructure systems.  As a result a fast 
track analysis report about ICT constraints [38] has been 
produced that investigates the current state of ICT in the UK 
and mostly focuses on communication infrastructure.  
However this research aims to extend this idea of focusing on 
telecommunication and instead investigates ICT in more detail 
by looking into software failures and limitations in 
infrastructure systems. This is to analyze how failures and 
limitations of some of these ICT Systems could impact and 
influence the infrastructure sectors. Interdependency 
interaction analysis between different sectors of national 
infrastructures is a core part of the ITRC project and this 
research. 
Dependable computing concepts [7]-[8] are the framework 
for analyzing and identifying ICT failures in this research.   
This research aims to investigate in more detail by 
identifying ICT failures and threats in infrastructure systems 
and use these understandings to develop a notation which 
could then be used for risk assessment, future development 
and disaster recovery procedures and modeling tools. 
Some of the infrastructure systems are old and not designed 
to handle interdependency, however it is not feasible to 
upgrade all computing software in infrastructure at once, 
mainly because of the cost.  As a result we face some sort of 
software limitation when merging new computing systems 
with old systems. This can lead to new and unknown 
vulnerabilities in overall systems.  In addition some of these 
new complex systems, such as smart meters [43] that are to be 
deployed in the UK, could face new technical, ethical and 
security challenges.  
The research reported in this paper was part of the UK Infrastructure Transitions 
Research Consortium (ITRC) funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council under Programme Grant EP/I01344X/. 
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 The following sections of this paper include background 
analysis by investigating interdependency, modeling 
techniques, dependability concepts and cyber threats. 
Problems and justification are covered in Section III and 
finally the high level presentation of timetable is presented in 
Section IV. 
 
II. Background and related work 
The main aim of this research project is to investigate and 
analyze the ICT failures in physical infrastructure and 
specifically how these failures could propagate through these 
interdependent sectors.  Infrastructure sectors are known to be 
a combination of ‘systems of systems’, that are all directly or 
indirectly connected and dependent on each other [1].   
There have been a number of studies about complex 
systems and interdependent networks [1] with the objective to 
design more robust and reliable systems and networks.  
Although some of these studies are not directly relevant to 
aging infrastructure, their general methodologies and 
approaches such as Top-down or Bottom-up approaches can 
be implemented in design, planning and analyzing the existing 
infrastructures. 
This section looks into the concept of interdependency in 
infrastructure including direct and indirect dependencies and 
also the strength and vulnerabilities of such interconnected 
systems.  It also analyzes some of the infrastructure modeling 
techniques used to model fragments of some of these sectors, 
and shows how helpful these models could be in planning and 
forecasting future development and failure preventions. 
The section also looks into dependable computing concepts 
[7]-[8] and how they could be related to infrastructure 
systems.  Finally this section looks at the cyber 
interdependency of these sectors and vulnerabilities and 
threats that modern infrastructure faces.        
 
A. Infrastructure as complex and interdependent systems 
 In general most studies have focused on a single and 
isolated sector in order to get better understanding of failures 
and operations of these systems [10]-[11].  However 
infrastructures share similar attributes as they are all complex 
adaptive systems [9], and they show a large number of 
interdependencies in different ways [1] as follows: 
• Physical interdependency when energy, material or 
people migrate from one infrastructure to another. 
• Cyber interdependency is when information is 
transmitted or exchanged between infrastructures. For 
instance, the reliance of some ICS (Industry control 
systems) in the energy sector on the transmission of 
data over networks for controlling purposes or traffic 
data in the case of the transport sector. 
• Geographical interdependency is a close spatial 
proximity of the elements of infrastructure such that a 
failure in a node in an area could have an effect on the 
other nearby infrastructures.  For instance flooding in 
an area where the road for transporting coal to a power 
station is blocked could result in power outage and 
cascade through the neighbouring nodes. 
• Logical interdependencies that can be a combination 
of all other types of connections such as financial 
dependence, political coordination and so on. 
 Advances in cyber-based systems and communication 
infrastructure have resulted in increased coupling of entire 
infrastructures to become more robust and efficient. 
Nevertheless the close coupling introduces new vulnerabilities 
in these dependent systems [13] such as cascading failures.   
 One of the key points and properties of interdependent 
infrastructures is that sometimes even a minor failure can lead 
to failure of dependent infrastructure and cascade to other 
networks recursively.  For instance the 2003 blackout in which 
large parts of Midwest and Northeast United States and 
Ontario, Canada experienced electrical power outage. Another 
example of cascading failure is the 2003 electrical blackout 
that affected much of Italy. In this second case the power 
outage resulted in failure of Internet communicating nodes, 
which in turn caused more power station breakdowns [12]. 
  Some of these interdependencies are straightforward, easy 
to analyze and investigate. For example all infrastructures rely 
on availability of electricity to operate.  However it becomes 
more sophisticated and complicated once we begin to look at 
the cyber dependency failures of these systems and to show 
the impacts on all dependent systems. While some of this 
interdependency is clear and easier to identify, the rest might 
be unclear and can only be understood with complex system 
analysis [14]-[15]. 
 With such interdependencies in infrastructure the terms 
failure and fault have different meanings based on each sector. 
For instance material fault and software fault are two different 
notations with different origins and implications.  The first one 
might be caused by natural hazard or usage whereas the 
second one could be as a result of human error [16].  
 Infrastructures are complex in their own right and not easy 
to analyze, specifically when considering the market, 
government regulations, economic benefits, policy making 
and technical aspects that need to be considered for each 
sector.  It is also true that infrastructures do not exist 
individually and are highly interdependent.  To fully 
understand the scope and operational characteristic of 
infrastructures their interdependencies must be integral to any 
analysis [17].      
B. Modeling and simulation techniques 
Modeling and simulation are known to be essential for 
ensuring the safe, reliable and continuous operation of critical 
infrastructure [17].   There are a number of modeling 
techniques and tools available to analyze the individual and 
interdependent sectors, each of them to analyze different 
aspects of infrastructure. There are various well developed 
commercial models and simulation tools of individual 
infrastructure available to help the owners to operate and 
manage systems. 
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 Some of these modeling techniques can be separated into 
six different categories as follows [17]-[21]-[20]: 
• Agent Based Model (ABM) is a class of 
computational models for simulating the actions and 
interactions of autonomous agents with a view to 
assessing their effects on the system as a whole. 
ABMs have been used widely in infrastructure and 
interdependency analysis [18]-[19].  ABMs are 
capable of capturing interactions in an accurate, yet 
simple, fashion.  By using ABM it is possible to 
analyze the characteristics and state of an 
infrastructure by modeling the physical component as 
an agent. 
• Physical Based Models (PBM) can be modeled and 
analyzed with standard engineering techniques.  For 
instance power flow and stability analysis can be 
performed on the electric power grids. This analysis 
can go into more detail at component level and 
examine issues like power outage with single or 
multiple associated connected nodes [20].  
• Population Mobility Models: The examination of 
entities through urban regions and their interaction 
with each other. 
• Economic Models: Including Leontief input-output 
models of economic flow. 
• Dynamic Simulations: Modeling the generation, 
distribution and consumption of infrastructure 
commodities and services as flows and 
accumulations. 
• Aggregate Supply and Demand Tools: An 
evaluation of the total demand for infrastructure 
services in a region together with the ability to supply 
those services. 
There have been attempts to model Cyber-Physical Systems 
(CPS) using semantic agents [22]; however it is not possible to 
accurately model and represent these systems in a way that 
covers all necessary operations of interdependent sectors using 
CPSs [23]. 
In addition to modeling tools and techniques, simulation 
frameworks that allow coupling of multiple interdependent 
infrastructures have emerged [5].  For instance the National 
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Centre (NISAC) based 
in USA has developed tools to address cyber and physical 
dependencies and interdependencies in an all-hazards context 
[5]- [24]. 
There is a wide range of literature available which 
investigates the interdependency, risk analysis and supply and 
demand chain.  However there is lack of models and 
simulation tools which consider the ICT sector in connection 
with other infrastructures, and are capable of analyzing ICT 
failures or predicting future behaviors.   
   
C. Dependable Systems 
The notation of dependability is the property of a computer 
system that allows reliance to be justifiably placed on the 
service it delivers [7].  A dependable system should have the 
following attribute: availability, reliability, safety, integrity 
and maintainability [8]. 
Based on [7] an error could lead to failure if there is lack of 
system compositions such as redundancy or the definition of 
failure from the user’s viewpoint.  For instance [25] argues 
that scheduled maintenance of a power plant which needs to 
be shut down and does not provide service should not be 
considered as a system failure. In the dependability concept 
[7-8] fault, error and failures are described as follow: 
• Fault is the cause of an error.  
• Error is part of the system state which could lead a 
service failure 
• Failure occurs when the delivered service deviates 
from the correct service. 
Complex infrastructure systems and complex software 
systems both share some similarities such that failures in 
each of these systems can have direct or indirect effects on 
their dependent systems. 
• Cascading failure is a disruption in one system that 
could cause a fault in another system. For example in 
infrastructure we can refer back to the 2003 blackout 
in America that led to communication and water 
supply outage and air traffic disruption [26]. The 
cause was a software bug in the alarm system at a 
control room of the FirstEnergy Corporation in Ohio 
[26]. 
• Escalating failure is a disruption in one 
infrastructure that exacerbates an independent 
disruption in a second infrastructure. For instance the 
recovery and restoration of service in one 
infrastructure is made more difficult because another 
infrastructure is not available. 
• Common cause failure is disruption of two or more 
infrastructures at the same time as the result of the 
same cause. For instance flooding could impact 
electric power, transport system, communication, gas 
and water supply. 
Dependability concepts are specifically helpful in this 
research, as the ICT failures in infrastructure will be measured 
against these dependability notations.  
 
D. Cyber threats to infrastructure 
Infrastructures are highly dependent on ICT. The type of 
dependency varies significantly depending on the purpose and 
service of the ICT component. For example, supervisory 
control and data acquisition systems (SCADAs) are part of 
operational networks, composed of computer systems that 
yield the operational ability to supervise acquire data from and 
control the physical process [27].  Classically SCADA 
systems were not designed to be widely distributed or 
remotely accessible. However most of these systems are now 
connected to the Internet and could be vulnerable to 
dependency failures and malicious attacks [28]-[29].    
For instance the vulnerabilities of a power system include 
three main components: computer, communication, and the 
power generator itself [39]. Attacks can be targeted at specific 
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systems, subsystems, and multiple locations simultaneously 
from a remote location. These types of vulnerabilities are all 
as a result of cyber dependency. 
One of most famous infrastructure threats has been the 
Stuxnet virus, which was designed with painstaking precision 
to burrow deep into Iran’s nuclear program and destroy 
physical infrastructure [41]. This is an indication to show how 
serious and devastating an ICT component failure could be for 
national infrastructure. Interestingly even after Stuxnet was 
detected another far less sophisticated malware called Mahdi 
managed to compromise engineering firms, government 
agencies and financial services firms in the Middle East [42].  
his is an indication that there is still not a clear understanding 
of how these ICT systems could be so vulnerable to even low 
level attacks. 
III. Problems and Justifications 
Infrastructure is fundamental to the functioning of 
economy and our daily lives.  It is important that infrastructure 
is available and reliable at all times.  Infrastructure has been 
developed over decades and in some cases even centuries.  
Therefore it is not possible and cost effective to try to redesign 
and reinvent everything from scratch. In 2010 UK engineering 
works were valued at £790 billion [30].  As discussed in 
Section II infrastructure is highly interdependent. However 
there are risks and opportunities associated with such 
interdependencies.  ICT can bring opportunities to other 
sectors and society by providing ease of functionality and 
services, such as smart metering [31], providing faster 
communication and more technological improvements and 
new inventions in providing services to other infrastructure 
systems such as safety systems in the transport sector.   
However with such rapid integration and dependency on 
ICT, the current infrastructure systems are becoming even 
more complex to analyze and model.  Complex systems can 
exhibit surprising behavior due to their complexity [32]. 
Current complex systems show an increase of structural, 
dynamic, functional and algorithmic complexity [32]. Such 
system complexities can cause challenges in design, operation, 
reliability and efficiency. 
Most of the focus on the ICT sector has been about 
communication and facilitating other infrastructures [4], for 
instance ensuring the availability of broadband and network 
services and upgrading current UK communication 
infrastructure by providing fiber optic broadband to consumers 
and other sectors [33]. By considering communication as a 
component of ICT it is easier to understand and to analyze 
availability, improvement and to measure failure impacts of 
the communication sector.  However once we try to look at the 
ICT sector as a whole and take a top-down approach to 
investigate the impact failures, we begin to face uncertainty 
due to the complexity of the ICT sector, lack of data and 
diverse ownership of the sector.   
One of the main objectives of this research is to investigate 
beyond telecommunication and understand failures in more 
detail by looking at operational software systems such as 
SCADAs, process control systems (PCS) or distributed control 
systems (DCS), which is a complex combination of SCADA 
and PCS.  To do this it is important to categorize types of 
failures and their possible impacts on infrastructure.  Using 
these types of failures we can build a bigger picture of the 
connected systems and predict future behaviors. This is 
specifically helpful in avoiding cascading failures, which 
could be the result of an ICT component failure in 
infrastructure.  Generally ICT and specifically SCADA 
systems all individually rely on software development 
procedures and offer some degree of fault tolerance within 
their design [34].  However since most of these systems are 
now connected to internal and external operational systems 
therefore they can be vulnerable to new types of failures that 
have not been considered when they were designed [27].   
Using these investigation results we can then model ICT 
components in infrastructure.  Although it is very complicated 
and expensive to model and simulate the ICT sector as a 
whole with its interdependencies to other sectors, if we know 
of the factors that cause failures we might be able to measure 
and model some portions of ICT failures with some degree of 
interdependencies which could be helpful in future risk 
assessment, planning and improvements of existing 
infrastructure.   
There are a number of alternative investigation methods 
available, such as top-down or bottom-up approaches.  A top-
down approach in conjunction with formal methods [35] is 
one of the options as it can be used to eliminate the details and 
instead focus on the overall system. However the downside is 
that we are dealing with a combination of existing 
infrastructures. This method works best if we plan and design 
a new infrastructure system or component from scratch as it 
can lead us to think about all current and future implications.  
With such complexity in infrastructure systems it is not 
feasible and cost effective to redesign everything, however the 
idea of a top-down approach could be used in cases of new 
developments such as hospitals [36], new railway systems or 
roads.   
Some researchers believe that when complex systems 
reach a certain size of complexity then algorithmic constraints 
often prohibit efficient top-down management and design 
[32].  It is suggested that self-organization is an alternative 
idea to manage complex systems. In this research we use a 
combination of the two approaches.  For instance we could use 
the top-down approach to identify the possible failures and use 
the bottom-up approach to decentralized the component at a 
micro level and allow the system component to either self-
organize or avoid cascading failures by having some kind of 
redundancy in place. 
Cyber threats to critical infrastructure and SCADA failures 
could be used as case studies for this research since they both 
cover interdependencies and can have direct impact on overall 
operation of infrastructure.  Because of the nature of this type 
of failure, the availability of data can be very limited. If, 
however, micro level failures are considered in each case 
(using the developed notation) this research could produce 
outcomes to show the extent and implications of each type 
failure on national infrastructure systems. 
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IV. Conclusion 
One of the key points in this research is to draw a clear 
understanding and identification of ICT failures in micro 
details.  Then depending on the types of failures, they can be 
categorized in different orders and magnitudes of impact.  For 
instance a computer server failure in a power station will have 
different impacts than the failure of a sensor that triggers when 
an electric fuse in an electric box fails within the same power 
station.  The server failure might shut down the station 
whereas fuse failure can only impact a small area.  Identifying 
these types of failures at the micro level will help in risk 
assessment and strategy planning and recovery procedures. 
Such failures can also be used in modeling some parts of the 
ICT sector. 
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